Tuesday, August 24, 2010

Retailers Join Forces for a "Make or Break" Attempt in Their Competitive Landscape

Amid the ongoing spate of mergers in the business software market, our attention was drawn to the recent mega-merger of two of the oldest retailers in the US. In late in 2004, just before the holiday rush, Kmart Holding Corporation (NASDAQ:KMRT), and Sears, Roebuck and Co. (NYSE:S), announced a definitive merger agreement to form the Sears Holdings Corporation. What is interesting, is not that Sears Holdings will become the US' third largest retailer, with approximately $55 billion in annual revenues, 2,350 full-line and off-mall stores, and 1,100 specialty retail stores. It is how they will merge two disparate information technology departments and supply chains.

Part One of the Retailers Join Forces for a "Make or Break" Attempt Their Competitive Landscapeseries.

The issue isn't that they offer diametrically opposed products and services. Kmart is a mass merchandising company that offers customers products through a portfolio of exclusive brands that include Thalia Sodi, Jaclyn Smith, Joe Boxer, Martha Stewart Everyday, Route 66 and Sesame Street. Similarly, Sears is a broad-line retailer providing merchandise and services including home merchandise, apparel, and automotive products and services through more than 2,300 Sears-branded and affiliated stores in the US and Canada. While the combined business will supposedly create a broader retail presence and improved scale through a national footprint of nearly 3,500 retail stores, it also will create significant issues for their supply chain systems. Alone, the sheer size of these enterprises can make internal coordination difficult with their odd conglomerations of business practices and enterprise application packages from a variety of vendors. The problem is further exasperated by how these systems will be amalgamated. Recognizing this issue, both Sears and Kmart have lately made significant strides in transforming their organizations. The merger is hoped to further accelerate this process. It hopes to also benefit from improved operational efficiency in areas such as procurement, marketing, IT and supply chain management (SCM).

Terms of the Agreement

The fruits of this merger were borne when Sears purchased around fifty Kmart store locations for approximately $575 million (USD) earlier in 2004. Edward S. Lampert, a savvy financier who acquired the $23 billion Kmart for less than $1 billion of Kmart bonds and other debt in bankruptcy court and became its largest shareholder and chairman of the board, has since orchestrated the merger.

Under the terms of the agreement, which was unanimously approved by both companies' boards of directors, Sears Holdings will be headquartered in Hoffman Estates, Illinois (US), and Kmart will continue to have a significant presence in Troy, Michigan (US). Kmart shareholders will receive one share of new Sears Holdings common stock for each Kmart share. Sears shareholders, in turn, can elect to receive $50.00 (USD) in cash or 0.5 shares of Sears Holdings (valued at $50.61 based on the closing price of Kmart shares at the time of the announcement) for each Sears share. Shareholder elections will be prorated to ensure that in the aggregate 55 percent of Sears shares will be converted into Sears Holdings shares and 45 percent of Sears shares will be converted into cash. The value of the transaction to Sears shareholders was, at the time, valued at approximately $11 billion (USD). Additionally, ESL Investments Inc., a Greenwich, Connecticut-based hedge fund, and its affiliates, which were founded and controlled by Kmart's chairman Lampert, agreed to vote all their Kmart and Sears shares in favor of the merger. They also elected the stock option with respect to their shares of Sears. Lampert will become the chairman of Sears Holdings.

Lampert will be joined in the office of the chairman by Alan J. Lacy, current chair and chief executive officer (CEO) of Sears, and Aylwin B. Lewis, current president and CEO of Kmart. Lacy will be vice chairman and CEO of Sears Holdings, and Lewis will be president of Sears Holdings and CEO of Kmart and Sears Retail. Glenn R. Richter, currently executive vice president (EVP) and chief financial officer (CFO) of Sears, will be EVP and CFO of Sears Holdings. William C. Crowley, currently senior vice president (SVP) of finance of Kmart and a Kmart Board member will be EVP of finance and integration of Sears Holdings. Lampert, Lacy, and Lewis will join the ten-member Sears Holdings board of directors, which will include seven members of the current Kmart board and three members of the current Sears board. Sears Holdings will act as the holding company for the Sears and Kmart businesses, which will continue to operate separately under their respective brand names.

Kmart has made great progress over the past eighteen months to strengthen the organization in terms of profitability and product offerings. The merger marks a remarkable comeback for Kmart, which filled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in early 2002 (see Wet Quarter Postpones Amazon's Desiccation While Kmart Drowns), which lead to about 600 stores (one third of stores at the time) to close; the termination of 57,000 former Kmart employees; and cancellation of company stock.

In March 2004, Kmart posted its first profitable quarter in three years, and the new management believes the merger will create a true leader in the retail industry—both as a key part of local communities and as a national presence. Together, Sears and Kmart hope to further enhance their capabilities to better serve customers by improving in-store execution and ultimately transform the customer's in-store experience.

Sears Holdings will strive to feature a renowned home appliance franchise as well as strong positions in the tools, lawn and garden, home electronics, and automotive repair and maintenance categories. Key proprietary brands coming from Sears include Kenmore, Craftsman, and DieHard. The combined company will naturally have a broader apparel offering, including well-known labels such as Lands' End, Jaclyn Smith, and Joe Boxer as well as the Apostrophe and Covington brands. It will also have Martha Stewart Everyday products, which are now offered exclusively in the US by Kmart and in Canada by Sears Canada.

With revenues in 2003 of $41.1 billion (USD), the independent Sears has been offering its wide range of merchandise through its stores and through sears.com, landsend.com, and specialty catalogs. It is also possibly the largest provider of product repair services with more than 14 million (USD) service calls made annually. Kmart specialty retail stores will, for some time, continue to carry their current lineup in proprietary home and fashion lines

K-Mart/Sears Merger Process Details

The combined companies is conservatively estimated to generate $500 million (USD) of annualized cost and revenue synergies to be fully realized by the end of the third year after closing. The transaction is reportedly expected to be significantly accretive to earnings per share in the first year before one-time restructuring costs. For one, the companies expect approximately $200 million (USD) in incremental gross margin by capitalizing on cross-selling opportunities between Kmart and Sears' proprietary brands and by converting a substantial number of off-mall Kmart stores to the Sears nameplate in addition to the fifty Kmart stores Sears acquired earlier in year.

Namely, in mid 2004, Kmart announced that it has signed a definitive agreement with Sears to sell up to 54 of its stores for a maximum purchase price of $621 million (USD) in cash. Kmart will continue to operate them until March or April 2005. Sears initially agreed to consider offering employment to any Kmart employee at the converted stores. Earlier in June, Kmart announced that it has also signed similar definitive agreements with The Home Depot, Inc., to sell up to twenty-four stores for a maximum purchase price of $365 million (USD) in cash. The exact number of stores, locations, and total purchase amount were based upon the satisfaction of certain conditions to occur within the next sixty days.

Eventually, the transactions with Sears and Home Depot represented a total purchase price of almost $1 billion (USD) for less than eighty of Kmart stores, or approximately 5 percent of its erstwhile store base. Thus, for each of the past several quarters, Kmart has consistently delivered improved year-over-year profitability and cash flow by focusing on the fundamental aspects of its business. Operationally, it touts improved several areas including product design, buying, inventory management, distribution and the in-store environment. By the same token, the retailer pledges to take advantage of opportunities to create value that include the sale of existing stores, or the acquisition of new stores and businesses. Some who follow Kmart have speculated solely on the real estate value of the company; however, the company counters that it has been taking action on many different fronts simultaneously, all with the goal of making Kmart a great retail company once again.

Additionally, Sears Holdings expects to achieve annual cost savings of over $300 million (USD) through improved merchandising and non-merchandising purchasing scale and improved supply chain, administrative, and other operational efficiencies. Further, the combined company will complete a full store asset review as part of a plan to monetize non-strategic real estate assets as appropriate. Crowley and Richter will jointly lead an integration team of key operating executives from both companies to drive planning and execution of the integration of the companies' operations. The merger, which is expected to close by the end of March 2005, is subject to approval by Kmart and Sears shareholders, regulatory approvals, and customary closing conditions. Lehman Brothers served as financial advisor to Kmart, and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP provided legal counsel to Kmart, whereas Morgan Stanley served as financial advisor to Sears, and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz provided legal counsel to Sears.

Early in 2005 Kmart Holding Corporation announced strong profitability and cash generation for November and December of 2004 (period ending December 29, 2004). At that time, Kmart's same store sales has a significantly moderate rate of decline. Kmart expected to generate a net income (excluding any asset sales and bankruptcy-related expenses) of approximately $250 million (USD) for November and December of 2004 with income before interest and income taxes (excluding any asset sales and bankruptcy-related expenses) of approximately $400 million (USD). This will represented an increase income of approximately $23 million (USD), or 10 percent over the same period in 2003. Same store sales for November and December declined by 4.6 percent—in December alone, same store sales declined approximately 2.6 percent. This, however, represented a significant improvement compared to trends from earlier in 2004. Gross margin improved by over 100 basis points over the prior year period. The goal for the combined company is to achieve a 10 percent operating margin like those of Gap and Target.

At the end of December, Kmart's inventory levels were approximately $3.1 billion (USD), while its cash balance grew from $2.1 billion (USD) at the end of its 2003 fiscal year on January 28, 2004 to approximately $3.9 billion (USD) at the end of December. Kmart is expected to be approximately $3.2 billion (USD) at the end of its 2004 fiscal year on January 26, 2005. The $3.2 billion (USD) does not include the roughly $400 million (USD) receivable from Sears, expected in March and April of 2005.

As a result of its cash balances and cash generation, Kmart has terminated the balance of an existing credit agreement which it has never drawn from, with the exception of letters of credit. Kmart also has stated that several banks have committed $3.5 billion of a $4 billion (USD) loan for capital to be used once during its $11 billion (USD) deal to buy Sears. The loan will be effective when Kmart buys retailer Sears, and the money will be available for five years to pay for working capital needs, capital expenditures, acquisitions, and other general corporate purposes. Banks providing money for the loan include JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Bank of America.

Federated/May Merger Details

Beside Kmart and Sears, it appears that many other retailers, especially department stores, have gone shopping for one another in their quest to increase revenues; fend off the scissor-like competition from both leading mass discounters and specialists; and lure to customers that are growing tired and bored with shopping malls. Recently, on February 28, Federated Department Stores, Inc. (NYSE:FD) and The May Department Stores Company (NYSE:MAY) announced a merger agreement. Pursuant to the transaction, each share of May will be converted into the right to receive $17.75 (USD) per share of cash and 0.3115 shares of Federated stock. Based on the 10-day trading average of Federated stock as of Friday, February 25, 2005, this equates to a value per share of $35.50, or $11 billion (USD) in total equity value. In addition, Federated will assume May's debt that was approximately $6 billion (USD) at year-end, for a total consideration of approximately $17 billion (USD). As part of this transaction, Federated has committed to increase its annual dividend to $1 (USD) per share.

The deal, reportedly approved by both companies' respective boards of directors a day before the announcement, will establish Federated as a $30 billion (USD) national retailer whose economies of scale and scope of operations—with stores in forty-nine states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia—should enable it to compete more effectively in the highly competitive retail sector. Currently, Federated has annual sales of $15.6 billion (USD) and has about 111,000 employees in 34 states. Founded 1929, headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, with corporate offices in Cincinnati and New York, Federated currently operates more than 450 stores in 34 states, Guam, and Puerto Rico under the names of Macy's, Bloomingdale's, Bon-Macy's, Burdines-Macy's, Goldsmith's-Macy's, Lazarus-Macy's, and Rich's-Macy's. The company also operates macys.com and Bloomingdale's By Mail, and is converting all regional department stores to Macy's brand effective March 6, 2005.

In the case of May, it has annual sales of $14.4 billion (USD) and about 132,000 employees in 46 states. Founded 1910, headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri (US), at the end of the fiscal 2004, May operated 491 department stores under the names of Famous-Barr, Filene's, Foley's, Hecht's, Kaufmann's, Lord & Taylor, L.S. Ayres, Marshall Field's, Meier & Frank, Robinsons-May, Strawbridge's, and The Jones Store. It also operated 239 David's Bridal stores, 449 After Hours Formalwear stores, and 11 Priscilla of Boston stores. May currently operates in forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Along a similar rationale to the earlier Kmart/Sears merger, this merger also touts the potential synergies from an expanded geographic reach, gathering more market power with suppliers, and slashing overlapping expenses. Once consummated, Federated will operate more than 950 department stores, along with approximately 700 bridal and formalwear stores. In addition, fifteen new states, mostly in the US heartland, will be layered onto Federated's existing thirty-four state operating base, with relatively little overlap between the companies' locations. As a result, Federated for the first time will supposedly have a truly national retail footprint, with stores in sixty-four of the nation's top sixty-five markets.

This transaction is expected to be accretive to Federated's earnings per share in 2007, whereby Federated expects to realize approximately $450 million (USD) in cost synergies by 2007. This will result from the consolidation of central functions, division integrations, and the adoption of best practices across the combined company. In addition, the company anticipates approximately $1 billion (USD) in one-time costs related to the acquisition and integration, spread out over a three-year period beginning in 2005. Federated said that while it intends to merge May's St. Louis corporate headquarters functions into its own Cincinnati and New York corporate offices, beginning this year, it intends to make St. Louis the headquarters of one of the major operating divisions to take advantage of St. Louis' considerable talent pool. Federated also said it will continue to honor and practice May's extensive philanthropic commitments to its communities.

While no division consolidations or store name changes are planned before 2006, Federated also said that it is likely that most of May's regional department stores will ultimately be converted to Macy's. The company touts considerable success in re-branding its own regional stores as Macy's, and obviously it anticipates continuing this strategy to some extent with its new stores. Operating regional stores primarily under one brand means the combined company can advertise nationally, unlike regional retailers, and this will be more cost-effective.

Among the benefits to customers arising from the acquisition, Federated cites lower costs; national marketing initiatives; expanded private brand merchandise lines; roll-outs of Federated's successful reinvented initiatives to May's department stores; expanded customer loyalty programs; and bridal and gift registries to a national customer base. The company admits it will take until mid-2007 to implement all of the anticipated changes from the acquisition, and it intends to take time to do it right. Its first priority is to continue to execute in all of its stores this year, while focusing behind the scenes on consolidating corporate and support operations.


SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/retailers-join-forces-for-a-make-or-break-attempt-in-their-competitive-landscape-17899/

Geac Gets Its Commonsense Share Of Consolidation, With Revolving Door CEOs No Less

Beyond the Market Impact of the events covered in Parts One and Two of this note, Geac Computer Corporation Limited (TSX: GAC) faces serious challenges.

Although it is functionally strong, Geac System21 has until recently lacked some of the technology and buzzword must haves' such as a web-based, server-centric architecture, XML-based integration and sales force automation (SFA) that have been natively provided by many of its rivals such as SAP, Intentia, IFS and J.D. Edwards. In contrast, Geac products have mostly "talked" to the outside modern collaborative world through a plethora of open APIs (application programming interfaces) and the company has remained content (or forced) to settle for best-of-breed' connectivity. Additional functional suites like CRM, advanced web-based product configuration management, business intelligence (BI) and so on have been provided largely through partner alliances such as with Cognos, Information Builders, and Business Objects for business intelligence (BI), Applix for its iCRM and interactive planning solution, and with former Frontstep for its SyteLine APS and SyteCenter solutions.

By delivering the above-mentioned native enhancements within System21 Aurora, Geac might partially allay some customers' fears that System 21 functionality will increasingly lag that of its major competitors. Still, the tacit stance Geac has assumed while developing the Aurora enhancements over the last few years has come with a cost of lost mind share and a consequent challenge of putting the product back on prospects' radar screens. In fact, Aurora is a 2nd or 3rd-generation of web-enablement, given the web-based supplier- and customer-facing applications have been available in earlier System21 versions since the late 1990's. This lost mindshare will make selling the product to new customers quite difficult, especially considering a tough selling climate.

Further, Geac will have to also embrace and promote a rock solid strategy for integrating its product suite with multiple partners. The company may benefit from following J.D. Edwards' example and closely partnering with a major enterprise applications integration (EAI) vendor in order to ease integration with its partners. In line with this thinking, Geac already has strong technology partnerships with IBM and Jacada (for hardware and middleware). The Aurora product uses the latest IBM technology, and the dependence on IBM has largely helped Geac curb its development costs while delivering a number of additional modules running on a unified platform.

Still, the process of harmonizing the installed user base across a controllable number of active software versions remains a major challenge. If history helps us predict the future, most contemporary vendors will not be able to pull off a smooth evolution from their current architecture to the next-generation. The problem largely involves the issue of being limited by the past, making it more difficult to truly transition to a new architecture (for more information, see What's Wrong with Application Software? It's the Economics).

It is needless to say that the still varied product portfolio under the Geac banner will inevitably take more pondering and soul-searching and may likely act as a distraction from the primary products' strategy. Geac has already begun to address this matter by divesting a number of less-profitable and non-viable products (see Geac Decomposes To Survive), but it still has a few products running on disparate platforms, from mainframes to web-based architectures.

Having an unfocused, multi-product and multi-technology strategy in markets with diverse dynamics typically multiplies and overstretches sales, R&D, and service & support resources, jeopardizing the products' possible long-term success in their respective niches. This market perception and sentiment is not to be neglected, as some customers feel that Geac essentially treats some venerable products like the M-Series (a.k.a., Millennium, acquired from former McCormack & Dodge) as a cash cow and has long not reinvested significantly in the product's enhancements. At the same time, the support fee is perceived as costly, while the Millennium architecture is unique enough that it is difficult to find resources to support the application independently. Time alone will tell whether the Extensity and Comshare acquisitions and IBM technology overlay will add some major new value atop these applications. At least, the opportunity seems to be there.

This is Part Three of a three-part note.

Part One detailed recent events.

Part Two discussed the Market Impact.

External Partnerships and Integration Costs

Geac still has quite a range of functionality to cover through external partnerships for some of its products, which gets increasingly complicated to track for several products and their multiple releases (see Geac Trying Its Luck in Partnering). The partnerships are intended to, for example, enhance Geac's StreamLine Windows NT/2000-based ERP solution aimed at manufacturing companies with 5 to 150 users. Geac's customers should benefit from being able to use Eden Origin, a tool that enables product configuration/product search engine via a Web-enabled interface. Through Geac's partnership with Preactor International, small to medium (SME) manufacturers might benefit from advanced planning and scheduling (APS) and finite capacity scheduling. However, given that the above functionalities have become all but commodities nowadays, Geac will have to work much harder on StreamLine's enhancements if it is to match the functionality from many competitors, as most of the e-business and CRM components are still lacking. The product's scope still remains within managing the flow of production through the supply chain, from purchasing of raw materials to sales and distribution of finished goods.

While the best-of-breed approach has its merits and is a necessity for some plant-level applications that ERP vendors do not typically provide (e.g., data acquisition), it inadvertently leads to additional integration costs and complicates service & support arrangements. Interfaces between disparate applications like ERP, SCM, CRM and/or e-business usually require significant tailoring across different product versions. Things can get even more complicated due to partners' potential troubled performance and subsequent demises or change of ownerships, like in the recent case of Applix iCRM divestiture or Frontstep's acquisition by MAPICS, which both happen to be embedded within some earlier Geac's products' instances, albeit under OEM agreements that give the vendor the right to source code. All of the above can be a barrier to future changes as further modifying already modified code is notoriously time consuming, costly, and risky.

Thus, Geac has some remaining work to do, in terms of functionally bolstering some of its previously neglected products and figuring out a middleware and web services framework for its users. The traditional problem for Geac has been its preference for acquiring new products rather than pursuing in-house product development and/or true strategic alliances. While the strategy might have worked in a number of esoteric industries with a low penetration of competitors like hotels & restaurants, real estate and construction, it is indisputably a completely different ball game in the global enterprise applications market in the mainstream industries. Modern enterprise applications must be able to support dynamic business requirements, and every vendor is compelled to add much more value to its products and services portfolio to attract and retain customers, rather than mainly invest in the existing bundle of disparate core products and hope for endless support revenues. Geac's fierce competitors mentioned earlier have long grasped this reality and have acted accordingly.

Realizing the crying need to change its faltering business model, Geac seems to be finally addressing its strategic options, with the above product strategy announcements showing it is serious about appeasing and shoring up its large customer base. One is only to hope that Geac's renewed interest in alliances and acquisition will be to the point of effectively enhancing prosperous product lines as required by its large installed base.

The Extensity and Comshare purchases should seemingly provide Geac with enhancements to its multiple core ERP systems for a modest price tag. In times when everybody is keeping a close eye on all IT investments, financial management products that help companies achieve better control of spending and/or streamlined financial processes should provide strong value propositions and quick Return on Investment (ROI). Geac's industries of interest such as construction, apparel, automotive, financial services, healthcare, property management, real estate, libraries, public safety and government all experience the need to streamline processes involving procurement and time/expense management. Comshare's MPC suite of financial planning, budgeting, forecasting and consolidation software should also provide many cross-sell opportunities to Geac's existing enterprise customers, since MPC should appeal to the same C-level executives and corporate controllers that rely on Geac's ERP transaction systems.

In addition to cross-selling more products to its existing customers, the acquisitions hold the potential of generating new customers. The tough financial climate bundled with increased regulatory requirements (i.e., the Sarbanes-Oxley act) put added pressure on measuring and optimizing business performance, and financial analysis and planning appear to be exactly what the doctor ordered. When C-level executives are held severely accountable for the accuracy of these reports, there should be a high priority and easy justification for investments in financial analysis and business performance management. The addition of Comshare MPC to the Geac product line is in direct response to requirements from Geac customers, given that AS/400-based applications have traditionally lagged in financial reporting capabilities. Geac's existing mainframe and client/server customers are also calling for financial reporting capabilities. One could notice a parallel with the recent SSA GT's acquisition of Elevon (formerly Walker Interactive), although one might be intrigued with low-profile publicity about the Elevon acquisition that was atypical to other recent SSA GT's purchases.

Given the saying "once bitten, twice shy," one should believe Geac will have carefully thought out the rationale for the above two acquisitions. Although there is still sizable work ahead winnowing out the remaining under-performing units/product lines, there is a strong opportunity, provided Geac can regenerate its growth strategy. Although it remains at the fringe of Tier 1 enterprise applications providers, the company's focus on real-time financial reporting and BPM has earned it renewed respect in the market and some new customers. Comshare, in its own right, was one of the first vendors to have produced an executive information system (EIS) capable of pulling in data from various applications and presenting it in a compact form. Unfortunately, the EIS technology has since been eclipsed through the advent of integrated BI suites and portal technologies. Further, although Comshare has achieved a strong customer satisfaction rating, its dubious viability has traditionally been a major hurdle when competing against much larger and more visible competitors like Hyperion or Cognos. Geac's deeper pockets and much larger size should help it allay these sorts of past problems.

Given the fact that Geac too was up for sale in 2000 (see Geac Lives By Acquisitions; Will It Die By An Acquisition?) its turnaround has been impressive. However, a frequent turnover of CEOs will not fly very favorably with the market, although Jones' appointment should indicate keeping the course. Moreover, the leaner company with a large customer base and a palatable market capitalization of slightly over $300 million remains an attractive acquisition target in this seismically consolidating market. Still, the recent Comshare acquisition for cash and an impending products' merger might put off the acquisition spotting vultures for the time being.


SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/geac-gets-its-commonsense-share-of-consolidation-with-revolving-door-ceos-no-less-part-three-challenges-and-user-recommendations-17032/

Geac Announces Q3 Results and Acquires CRM Vendor

In March, Geac Computer Corporation Limited announced its financial results for the third quarter and nine months ended January 31, 2000. Sales for the three months rose 32.5% to $281.9 million from $212.8 million the prior year (See Figure 1). Sales for the nine-month period grew 26.0% to $724.7 compared to $575.4 for the same period last year. The Company also announced plans to spin-off its inteRealty.com residential real estate B2B division.
Acquisitions made over the past nine months contributed $118 million to the increase in Geac's sales for the three months ended January 31, 2000. In particular, the acquisition of JBA Holdings, effective September 21, 1999, contributed over $100 million in sales to the quarter. For the nine months ended January 31, 2000, acquisitions contributed approximately $181 million to the Company's consolidated sales. For the third quarter, license and hardware sales increased 46% compared to the same three-month period last year. License and hardware sales comprised approximately 23% of the total sales for the quarter, with the balance made up of sales from recurring maintenance and service revenues. For the nine months ended January 31, 2000, consolidated sales were comprised of 23% license and hardware revenues and 77% maintenance and service revenues.

Net income for the third quarter was $0.9 million or $0.01 per fully diluted common share compared to $39.9 million or $0.61 per fully diluted common share last year. For the nine months ended January 31, 2000 net income was $58.9 million or $0.94 per fully diluted common share compared to $122.4 million or $1.88 per fully diluted common share the prior year.

Net income for the third quarter and nine months ended January 31, 2000 were impacted by charges related to the amortization of intangible assets acquired, particularly with the acquisition of JBA Holdings. Total amortization of intangible assets amounted to $38.1 million in the third quarter, including $30.4 million related to the acquisition of JBA, compared to $15.6 million last year. The prior year figure includes amortization of capitalized development costs.

In March, Geac also announced it had acquired RunTime, the Denmark-based e-Customer Relationship Management (eCRM) solutions provider to the apparel, footwear, and textile industries. RunTime has over 400 customers including Esprit, Betty Barclay, and Replay. RunTime's applications focus on the design and pre-production phases of the manufacturing process, customer relationship management, and sales force automation. The application has been tightly integrated with several leading ERP solutions, including System21 Style.

Bertrand Sciard, Managing Director of Geac Europe, stated: "RunTime has an extremely exciting and innovative set of products which have rapidly established a dominant position in their market. The solution is highly complementary to System21 Style. It has already been sold and is in joint production at several companies in Europe."

Douglas Bergeron, President and CEO of Geac, commented: "We are continuing our aggressive push into the ERP mid-market by acquiring a powerful eCRM solution. Our customers and prospects are looking for e-commerce CRM solutions that are proven and can be implemented immediately. RunTime is a very successful and profitable company that has been growing at over 30% per year. We are very proud to welcome them to Geac and see tremendous revenue synergies with our System21 business."

Michael Kildahl, CEO of RunTime added: "We see tremendous opportunities to sell our products across Geac's enormous customer base. Our employees and customers will benefit greatly as we enter into this new phase of company growth."

The joint System21 Style and RunTime solution will be marketed globally. Integration between the systems is achieved using System21's XML-based Application Integration Framework, and several customers are already experiencing the benefits of using the combined System21 Style and RunTime applications.

Henning Andersen, Director, Carli Gry A/S, commented: "We chose RunTime and System21 Style as the basis of our core systems because together they lead the market, therefore this acquisition bodes well for us. It will mean further development of both systems and greater integration between them. That leaves us in a powerful competitive position to further improve our operational performance."

Market Impact

There has long been a pressing need for this acquisition as we emphasized in our research note on Geac in March 2000 (see TEC Technology Note: "Geac: Mastering Growth by Acquisitions", March 6th, 2000). JBA's System 21 product has been losing ground to its competitors in the U.S. market during the last year. RunTime gives Geac a proven and solid CRM application in its industry, and without this acquisition, we believe that Gaec/JBA's business would have continued to hurt.

Geac has proven itself an adroit and disciplined acquirer of application software businesses. The latest announcement of its expedient incorporation of Clarus' former product line is the most recent example. Nonetheless, we expect the usual painstaking effort associated with merging companies. The mitigating factor, however, is the fact that JBA and RunTime had a marketing and development partnership. The technical problems are likely to arise with the future integration of the two products into a common interface and code base, which, we believe, Geac/JBA will have to undertake in order to continue to compete with the other top ERP vendors in the combined ERP and CRM space.

One reason for concern is whether this acquisition will result in CRM solutions for other JBA vertical industries like automotive and food & beverage. And what about the Geac's SmartEnterprise ERP product suite's CRM extension? The company will have to do a double take before deciding about any future acquisition since its profit has all but disappeared in the last quarter (see Figure 1). Another concern is the lack of significant licenses revenue growth despite a spate of recent acquisitions. Moreover, exceptionally low license revenue to service & maintenance revenue ratio of 23%/77%, compared to the industry benchmark of 38%/62% (Source TEC) may indicate sales and marketing execution problems as well as the product portfolio maturity and/or redundancy.



SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/geac-announces-q3-results-and-acquires-crm-vendor-15677/

Geac Decomposes To Survive

On April 3, Geac Computer Corporation Limited (TSE: GAC), a struggling Canadian supplier of enterprise management software, announced that it has completed the sale of its hotel business to Galaxy Hotel Systems LLC for approximately $ 1 million (US). Galaxy Hotel Systems is a subsidiary of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., the largest client of the hotel business.

"The sale of the hotel business is indicative of our intention to be a more focused company," declared John E. Caldwell, Geac's President and Chief Executive Officer. "We have had a long relationship with Starwood, a client whose needs and expectations our employees know well. This bodes well for the transition." "The sale of the hotel business is indicative of our intention to be a more focused company," declared John E. Caldwell, Geac's President and Chief Executive Officer. "We have had a long relationship with Starwood, a client whose needs and expectations our employees know well. This bodes well for the transition."

The event follows the company's unsuccessful attempt to sell itself as a whole. On March 26, Geac announced the conclusion of the strategic review process regarding the sale of the entire company. Following an extensive process involving several interested parties and facilitated by CIBC World Markets and Lazard Frres, no formal bid for Geac was received.

"Since we initiated the process, stock valuations have fallen markedly, particularly in the enterprise software sector. Combined with a tougher market for acquisition-related financing and the prospect of an economic slowdown, these circumstances had a negative impact on the potential sale of the entire Company," noted Caldwell. "We do not believe that Geac's current stock price accurately reflects the Company's long-term value. Today's announcement will remove customer uncertainty and enable management to implement focused plans to improve performance on a go-forward basis."

"As a matter of policy, the Board continues to examine all ways to maximize shareholder value. Other strategic alternatives continue to be considered, including the potential sale of some businesses. Over the next several weeks, significant additional cost reduction measures, including a substantial reduction of Geac's current staffing level, will be implemented to improve profitability. Our goal of placing customers' requirements first will be the center of our agenda. Our product and geographic diversity provide the platform to drive shareholder value. We will, however, be more focused on the industry sectors where our market presence and portfolio of solutions can most rapidly generate value for our customers and shareholders," concluded Caldwell.

On March 13, Geac announced the results for the three months ended January 31, 2001. Revenues from continuing operations were $218.0 million (Can) during the third quarter, a 21.6% decrease compared with $278.3 (Can) million during the third quarter last year, but a 7% increase compared to $203.8 million in the second quarter of the current fiscal year (See Figure 1).

Figure 1.

"Last quarter, we committed to improve operational and financial performance and to strengthen our cash position," said Caldwell. "The restructuring and cost control initiatives implemented over the past months contributed to measurably improved results. Going forward, further initiatives will be implemented in a number of our businesses to further focus on our customers and to improve our profitability. Operationally, the Company performed well. We successfully completed and launched SmartStream 6.5 as well as a number of new products. It was also a strong quarter for customer renewal of maintenance support contracts."

Following a review of the carrying value of each of its businesses, Geac wrote down the value of acquired software and goodwill associated with certain past acquisitions. A net charge of $211.4 million was recorded in the third quarter for this purpose. This reduction in carrying value relates primarily to the 1999 purchase of JBA Holdings plc. Including this adjustment to carrying value, the net loss for the quarter was a hefty $218.9 million, compared with net income of $0.9 million during the same period last year.

"Geac will increasingly focus on the industry sectors where its market presence and portfolio of solutions can most rapidly generate profits and deliver the best value to our customers," Caldwell continued. "We will apply our efforts to improving our performance, with an emphasis on the higher margin enterprise software marketplace, and to build upon the exciting opportunities in the real estate software sector through our Interealty division."

Market Impact

These are the bleak days in Geac's history, and not many expected the speed and extent of events. From the prospects of fiercely competing with other ERP players, Geac has virtually overnight found itself fighting for a bare survival. Its unbridled acquisition strategy in a number of unrelated, diverse fields and in the face of the overall weakness of the ERP market has resulted in insufficient growth, a disconcerted user base, and dismal results. Executives' departures and numerous staff reduction initiatives have been the final straws in this slew of negative events.

While Geac's difficulties partly originate from the slump of the ERP market and current economic slowdown, the main culprit was poorly executed acquisition of once prominent UK-based ERP vendor JBA in 1999. The acquisition has unfortunately stopped short of producing the great synergy it seemed to have offered initially. Whether the reason for it was the clash of platform-aligned cultures (NT-based Geac products opposed to mainly AS/400-based JBA System 21) and the subsequent (in)voluntary exodus of former JBA management is now less important. The reality is that Geac has not significantly enhanced System 21 since (except for Web-enabling it through Universal Commerce Adapter (UCA) based on Jacada technology and for embedding acquired CRM and SCE products for the apparel industry only). Consequently, Geac has been unable to successfully market its System 21 product. The bottom line - more agile competitors have functionally leapfrogged a once very attractive product and captured the market share, while the existing JBA System 21 users have increasingly been voicing concerns for their investment, as recently reported by VNUnet.com, a leading European IT news portal.

A well-known problem for Geac has been its preference for acquiring new products rather than pursuing in-house product development and/or true strategic alliances. While the strategy might have worked in a number of esoteric industries with a low penetration of competitors like hospitality, real estate and publishing, it is indisputably, a completely different ball game in the global enterprise applications market in the mainstream industries. Modern enterprise applications must be able to support dynamic business requirements, and every vendor is compelled to add much more value to its products and services portfolio to attract and retain customers, rather than mainly investing in the existing bundle of disparate core products and hoping for endless support revenues.

Sticking to this thrifty strategy instead of taking decisive action to breathe fresh air into its arsenal of products, have backfired on Geac and relegated it in the back seat of the enterprise applications market. Therefore, it is positive news that Geac continues development of its flagship SmartStream product, having just recently launched SmartStream v6.5. That is not going to appease the System 21 users though, that are shouting blue murder for not being appropriately informed about the product's future. Realizing the crying need to change its faltering business model, Geac seems to be taking a more vigorous posture in addressing its strategic options. Look for more product strategy announcements in the near future if Geac is serious about appeasing and shoring up its large customer base.



SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/geac-decomposes-to-survive-16364/

Customer Relationship Management: Evolution, Not Revolution

Choosing a new customer relationship management (CRM) solution can be onerous for anyone saddled with this task. But the process of choosing a solution doesn't have to be time-consuming and tedious. Nor should it cause major upheaval in an enterprise's operations, creating significant inconvenience for users. The last thing any manager wants is apathy—or even mutiny—from disgruntled employees “forced” to use an application that doesn't suit their needs or that is too complex to be adopted quickly.

Instead, a CRM solution should be implemented so that users are fully supported and feel that the tools at hand are helping them to get the job done, not adding an extra element of responsibility to their workdays. What you don't want is hand-to-hand combat when trying to encourage employees to use new applications, as lack of user buy-in is one of the most common reasons for CRM project failure.

The application you choose should, in fact, increase efficiency. And hand in hand with efficiency, you expect either a reduction in costs, or an increase in profit. Ideally, you'll get a quantifiable return on what can be a significant investment.

But First, What Is CRM?

CRM is a process of improving a business's relationships with its customers, using software applications that target the requirements of the business's processes. CRM can strengthen these relationships in a number of ways. Typically, CRM applications fulfill one of three key functionalities related to managing customer information: marketing, sales, or service. Software modules are generally broken down into four functional areas: sales automation, marketing automation, customer service and support, and a reporting and analysis tool. Some CRM packages are comprehensive, meaning that they incorporate aspects of all four functions.

So how do you know if you need a comprehensive package?

This partly depends on whether your enterprise is small-to-medium, or whether it is a huge national industry or multinational corporation. It also depends on how many aspects of your customer relationships you think could do with a little revolutionizing—or “evolutionizing.” And finally, it depends on your company's budget.

What Are the Features of CRM?

In order for CRM to effect positive change in your company, its features should speak to all activities involving customer interactions. But don't stop at thinking this means only face-to-face interactions. CRM should include features that take into account all ways the customer comes in contact with the company—before, during, and after a sale. Therefore, advertising campaigns and customer complaints are just as important as that friendly smile offered to customers when they take their purchases and walk out of the store. All activities should emphasize to customers how much the company values them—and, for a more personalized experience, how well the company knows them. So that when you thank customers and invite them to “come again,” there's a much better chance that they will.

CRM can include any of the following features:

* call management
* customer management
* service issues management
* knowledge exchange management
* sales force activities
* marketing campaign management
* sale lead tracking
* marketing analysis and forecasting
* database storage

Packages that are tailored separately for the sales, marketing, or service aspects of CRM have additional features. Customer service and support automation, for example, may have such features as call routing, contact center sales support, and tools for measuring customer satisfaction. Marketing features might detail sales activities and time management, and allow for analyzing and reporting on sales opportunities.

But How Are These Features Going to Benefit My Business?

One simple way to sum up the benefits of CRM is this: better relationships with your customers. But, this is likely self-evident from the very name of the software—though of course “manage” is not necessarily synonymous with “improve.” What you really need to know is how exactly the many features of CRM can restructure and improve your relationships with clients.

Here are some key benefits:

* Data management and analysis tools help you to track customer preferences and to anticipate needs based on individual purchase histories, over time and according to changes in the marketplace.

* Marketing automation helps you create targeted campaigns based on those anticipated needs.

* Costs are reduced as a result of more efficient post-purchase support and service.

* As a stable base of satisfied repeat customers is created, more time can be spent on expanding the client base.

* Profitability and revenue can increase as a result of improved relationships with clients both old and new.

* New software can be merged with a business's existing platform or with other previously installed software applications, such as enterprise resource planning (ERP), sales force automation (SFA), and e-mail programs.

* Operations can be streamlined to increase competitive advantage and to cut costs.

* Customer loyalty is boosted by making the enterprise customer-centric instead of product-centric.

* Customers are able to report on how they experience the enterprise.

And the Number One Benefit of Implementing a CRM Solution Is …

Quantifying all the benefits is the easy part, but the number one benefit is really up to you to determine. What exactly do you want a CRM package to do for your business? It is essential to perform a thorough comparative analysis to find the solution that provides the benefit that best meets your needs.

What Industries Can Use CRM, and What Are the Advantages?

CRM can be used by a broad spectrum of industries and enterprises. Applications have been designed for specific domains, including aerospace, automotive, call centers, real estate, telecommunications, financial and banking, energy, government, legal services, manufacturing, health care and pharmaceutical, retail, transportation, and travel.

* Financial and insurance markets
This solution includes features of comprehensive CRM packages, but is designed to help financial and insurance markets with their specific client bases. Among its features and functions are policy tracking and investment tracking in order to enhance client databases. Software from some vendors might allow customer data to be consolidated, permit better communication between branches, and reduce staff training costs.

* Real estate
CRM for this sector helps vendors to improve customer relationships by capturing online leads, increasing the volume of higher-quality leads, performing personalized electronic marketing campaigns, and automating various administrative processes such as prospecting, quoting, and financing.

* Telecommunications
Solutions specifically designed for this industry can help reduce churn rates, generate new sales opportunities, and increase customer retention. In an era when the number of competitors seems to keep pace with the number of services provided, CRM can allow companies to bundle their services, thereby reducing cost as well as preserving an evermore fickle client base.

* Travel and transportation
Among the many industry-specific functions of this CRM solution, automated campaign management and SFA can help businesses consolidate client data and improve passenger experiences. As a result, increased productivity, higher traffic volumes, and reduced costs become the benefits for this sector.

* Health care and pharmaceutical
For the pharmaceutical industry, a CRM application can facilitate improved sales presentations, better promotion of product information, and better collaboration with physicians regarding product market demographics.

* Government
Yes, even in a domain that is not profit-motivated and that prefers the word “citizens” over “customers,” CRM applications can provide benefits. Across the board, government departments are constantly striving to improve “customer service” and overall user satisfaction, and can do so with a CRM application that merges services and permits quicker response.

Evolution, Not Revolution

Expecting to have CRM up and running the minute the applications are installed in your system is unreasonable. Reports abound concerning the problems with implementing CRM too quickly, without training, or without user buy-in. But you don't have to become part of the alleged 60 to 80 percent of businesses that end up squirming in that combat zone known as the marketplace.

Here's a brief inventory of what not to do when choosing and implementing a CRM application:

* Don't forget senior management (if you don't get buy-in here, you may be unable to obtain the leverage you need to overcome bottlenecks in the selection project).

* Don't spend more—or not too much more—than you've budgeted.

* Choose a CRM application carefully. Determine your needs before you start looking for an application by performing an in-depth comparison of your short-listed solutions.

* Further your investment by ensuring your employees are properly trained on the new CRM solution. Allow adequate time—and consider the timing. In other words, don't do the training so far in advance that by the time the solution is implemented, employees are beginning to forget what they've learned.



SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/customer-relationship-management-evolution-not-revolution-19108/

Space: The Final Frontier How Retailers Make Shelf Space Allocation Decisions

In both retail and consumer product goods sectors, the gap between winners and losers widens every day. What is it about the winners that make them more and more successful, extending their lead every quarter? What are the dynamics driving this "battlefront" between retailers and their suppliers in the struggle for projects, profits, customers, and market share? What can suppliers do to win more exposure and space? To answer these questions, ChainLink Research surveyed more than 130 leading retailers and manufacturers.

The research found that the processes, policies, performance, and enablers widen the gap between winners and losers. Top-performing suppliers with high volumes and strong brands are rewarded with more shelf space and increased visibility, which further strengthens their brand and volumes. Marginal performers are "starved" out of the system. This study confirms one of ChainLink Research's key tenets: Winners and losers are determined by how well each player manages the links with trading partners (see figure 1). Disconnects in processes, perceptions, and dialogues between trading partners are a major cause of problems and competitive disadvantages.


The survey showed that suppliers often underestimate the importance of yield to retailers, while overestimating their own performance. Suppliers that understand and support retailers' goals and differentiation have a much higher likelihood of success.

Shelf-space and Category Management

Shelf-space Allocation

Four of the five top criteria used by retailers' sales volume, individual product's profit, individual product's revenue per square foot, and brand/category leadership, are directly related to the strength of the supplier's product performance, value contribution, and ultimately customer preference. Top performers get more real estate, while the losers are squeezed out.

Suppliers overestimate the importance of their overall profit contribution. Category managers want to allocate shelf space based on each individual product's role and contribution in driving profit or driving traffic. This goal is complicated when suppliers price their line as a portfolio. The retailer may want decoupled pricing to give them the flexibility to select an optimum mix.

Suppliers also underestimate the importance of seasonality in shelf-space decisions compared with retailers that ranked it as the third most important factor. This is surprising, given that suppliers must understand as well as anyone the impact of seasonality on the demand for their products. They may view it as just a given—products are either in the assortment or out in a given season.

Interestingly, slotting fees, which have been the subject of much heated debate, were rated as the least important factor in shelf-space decisions, by a large margin.

Category Management

The research also asked how far the industry has gone in the trend toward suppliers having more responsibility for restocking and replenishment decisions for the shelf space. (Note: chart for this question is not included.) Retailers said they are still responsible for about 85 percent of replenishment decisions and suppliers are responsible for only about 5 percent of those decisions, although suppliers estimated slightly higher numbers for their share of the task. Retailers said 6 percent of replenishment decisions were made collaboratively and 4 percent by third parties. The survey also asked the same question about responsibility for category management

The responses reinforced how infrequently suppliers are selected to manage categories. It also uncovers a large difference in perception. Suppliers claim to make about 17 percent of category management decisions, whereas retailers say the figure is about 3 percent. This may be due to a difference of interpretation of what is meant by "managing" the category. Retailers, even if they rely heavily on manufacturers for insight and analytics, will still claim they make the final decision.

The responses in figure 3 mask the degree to which retailers rely on suppliers' knowledge and input in making category decisions. As shown in figure 4, supplier knowledge is almost as important as POS information in managing categories and shelf space. Retailers frequently are not willing to hand over the final category management decisions to the supplier, but they do leverage the information and experience of the supplier.


SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/space-the-final-frontier-how-retailers-make-shelf-space-allocation-decisions-17847/

Epicor Software Corp.: Completing Painstaking "e"Volution Part 1: About Epicor

Geac Computer Corporation Limited manufactures, services, and rents systems, hardware, and enterprise applications to large and small organizations worldwide. Geac is the largest Canadian and one of the largest and most successful international software companies. Its solutions are specifically designed for the critical needs of users in the banking industry, hospitality markets (restaurants and hotels), newspaper publishing, public safety, property management & real estate, and libraries.

Geac is also a best-of-breed provider of mainframe and client/server cross industry solutions for financial administration and human resources (HR) functions, and enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications for manufacturing, distribution, and supply chain management. Founded in 1971, with headquarters in Markham, Canada, Geac has been experiencing a steady growth over the last decade. It has been a publicly traded company on the Toronto Stock Exchange since 1983, with revenues of Can$793.2 million in fiscal 1999.

Geac has grown from a small company focused on libraries and banking/financing in the early 1990s, to an applications software giant with more than 5,200 employees with 90 offices in 18 countries. Through its growth-by-acquisition strategy, the company has increasingly expanded its range of solutions targeting vertical industries. Over the last five years, Geac has acquired in excess of 40 companies around the world.

As a result of its acquisition of Dun & Bradstreet Software in 1996, Geac formed its SmartEnterprise Solutions division, which provides mid- to large-sized enterprises with advanced best-of-breed financial, procurement, human resources and business intelligence solutions. Its multiple platform client/server 'SmartStream', mainframe 'E' Series and 'M' Series, and SQL product suites enable organizations to streamline business processes and enhance information access throughout their enterprises.

Geac's purchase of UK-based ERP software maker JBA International in 1999 has nearly doubled the company's size. With the addition of JBA, Geac is expected to surpass US$1 billion in revenue and occupy the 4th largest ERP vendor position.

Geac serves its worldwide base of more than 30,000 customers in more than 40 countries through direct sales, support, and affiliate locations worldwide. The company operates throughout the world, and as such segments its revenues geographically. In 1999, 68% of total revenues came from the USA and Latin America, 18% from Europe, 7% from Canada, and 7% from Australasia. The large majority of Geac's revenues are derived from maintenance and professional services (76%), with the rest coming from the actual sale and licensing of software and hardware products.

We expect acquisitions to continue to form an integral part of Geac's overall growth strategy, and the company to continue to be a leading global consolidator of mission critical applications in distinct niches within industrial, commercial and government sectors.

Vendor Strengths

Geac has proven itself an adroit and disciplined acquirer of application software businesses. Selective acquisitions have added breath through both attractive untapped market segments and a worldwide market presence. Its large customer base and strong widespread global presence will provide Geac a sustained service and support revenue stream in the future.

Geac has demonstrated a very proficient focus in niche industries that are currently untapped by other leading ERP vendors (Geac is regarded as one of the Top 3 solutions for Libraries, Property & Real Estate, Cash & Securities Reconciliation, and Newspaper Publishing Industries). The mission-critical nature of its solutions makes the company a "first call provider" in these esoteric markets whose customers turn to it first for further system enhancements.

The company is generally competitive in speed of implementation, total cost of ownership (TCO), and price/performance ratio. Geac was one of the first ERP vendors to embrace concepts of component technology, workflow- and Web-enablement, and interconnectivity with other vendors' systems. Furthermore, its products run on a broad set of the most popular platforms and databases. Its broad range of multiple platform products, worldwide coverage, and significant maintenance revenue stream tend to cushion the blow from any technological change and/or vendor intrusion.

Geac is financially viable and stable (See Fig. 1 & 2 - Geac Computer Corporation Ltd. - Annual & Quarterly Results). It has a lean general & administrative headcount and keeps its business units manageable in size. As a result, the company generates significant free cash flow and maintains one of the highest 'revenue per employee' ratios within the industry.

Vendor Challenges

Due to its late expansion into the ERP world and since its product portfolio is regarded as a bunch of niche point solutions (as opposed to a complete ERP product suite), the company may struggle for recognition as a potential strategic partner when involved in software selections against other, even smaller ERP suppliers. Its best-of-breed solutions provider strategy may fall flat with customers who prefer a vendor that can leverage a "one-stop shop" capability.

In order to maintain its strong growth, Geac intends to continue with both software solutions and service provider acquisitions. This will pose a challenge of avoiding both financial indigestion and creation of an unmanageable product portfolio of very diverse solutions. Some of its products are already in a maturity phase and will have to be either discontinued or retrofitted. In addition, the continual need of integrating/interfacing new products with its current or other vendors' products will require a very careful balancing of R&D expenses with a desired operational profitability.

We believe that Geac has a narrow choice of complete vertical industry solutions compared to other large ERP vendors. It only recently introduced Web-based self-service applications, which is significantly later than some much smaller competitors (e.g. Great Plains and Lawson Software). Furthermore, the lack of Client Relationship Management (CRM) and Advanced Planning & Scheduling (APS) modules in its product suite will remain, even after the incorporation of JBA and Clarus. This adds additional future integration issues to a company that already faces massive integration of its disparate ERP systems.



SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/epicor-software-corp-completing-painstaking-e-volution-part-1-about-epicor-16345/

Geac Computer Corporation: Mastering Growth by Acquisitions

Geac Computer Corporation Limited manufactures, services, and rents systems, hardware, and enterprise applications to large and small organizations worldwide. Geac is the largest Canadian and one of the largest and most successful international software companies. Its solutions are specifically designed for the critical needs of users in the banking industry, hospitality markets (restaurants and hotels), newspaper publishing, public safety, property management & real estate, and libraries.

Geac is also a best-of-breed provider of mainframe and client/server cross industry solutions for financial administration and human resources (HR) functions, and enterprise resource planning (ERP) applications for manufacturing, distribution, and supply chain management. Founded in 1971, with headquarters in Markham, Canada, Geac has been experiencing a steady growth over the last decade. It has been a publicly traded company on the Toronto Stock Exchange since 1983, with revenues of Can$793.2 million in fiscal 1999.

As a result of its acquisition of Dun & Bradstreet Software in 1996, Geac formed its SmartEnterprise Solutions division, which provides mid- to large-sized enterprises with advanced best-of-breed financial, procurement, human resources and business intelligence solutions. Its multiple platform client/server 'SmartStream', mainframe 'E' Series and 'M' Series, and SQL product suites enable organizations to streamline business processes and enhance information access throughout their enterprises.

Geac's purchase of UK-based ERP software maker JBA International in 1999 has nearly doubled the company's size. With the addition of JBA, Geac is expected to surpass US$1 billion in revenue and occupy the 4th largest ERP vendor position.

Geac serves its worldwide base of more than 30,000 customers in more than 40 countries through direct sales, support, and affiliate locations worldwide. The company operates throughout the world, and as such segments its revenues geographically. In 1999, 68% of total revenues came from the USA and Latin America, 18% from Europe, 7% from Canada, and 7% from Australasia. The large majority of Geac's revenues are derived from maintenance and professional services (76%), with the rest coming from the actual sale and licensing of software and hardware products.

We expect acquisitions to continue to form an integral part of Geac's overall growth strategy, and the company to continue to be a leading global consolidator of mission critical applications in distinct niches within industrial, commercial and government sectors.

Vendor Strengths

Geac has proven itself an adroit and disciplined acquirer of application software businesses. Selective acquisitions have added breath through both attractive untapped market segments and a worldwide market presence. Its large customer base and strong widespread global presence will provide Geac a sustained service and support revenue stream in the future.

Geac has demonstrated a very proficient focus in niche industries that are currently untapped by other leading ERP vendors (Geac is regarded as one of the Top 3 solutions for Libraries, Property & Real Estate, Cash & Securities Reconciliation, and Newspaper Publishing Industries). The mission-critical nature of its solutions makes the company a "first call provider" in these esoteric markets whose customers turn to it first for further system enhancements.

The company is generally competitive in speed of implementation, total cost of ownership (TCO), and price/performance ratio. Geac was one of the first ERP vendors to embrace concepts of component technology, workflow- and Web-enablement, and interconnectivity with other vendors' systems. Furthermore, its products run on a broad set of the most popular platforms and databases. Its broad range of multiple platform products, worldwide coverage, and significant maintenance revenue stream tend to cushion the blow from any technological change and/or vendor intrusion.

Geac is financially viable and stable (See Fig. 1 & 2 - Geac Computer Corporation Ltd. - Annual & Quarterly Results). It has a lean general & administrative headcount and keeps its business units manageable in size. As a result, the company generates significant free cash flow and maintains one of the highest 'revenue per employee' ratios within the industry.

Vendor Challenges

Due to its late expansion into the ERP world and since its product portfolio is regarded as a bunch of niche point solutions (as opposed to a complete ERP product suite), the company may struggle for recognition as a potential strategic partner when involved in software selections against other, even smaller ERP suppliers. Its best-of-breed solutions provider strategy may fall flat with customers who prefer a vendor that can leverage a "one-stop shop" capability.

In order to maintain its strong growth, Geac intends to continue with both software solutions and service provider acquisitions. This will pose a challenge of avoiding both financial indigestion and creation of an unmanageable product portfolio of very diverse solutions. Some of its products are already in a maturity phase and will have to be either discontinued or retrofitted. In addition, the continual need of integrating/interfacing new products with its current or other vendors' products will require a very careful balancing of R&D expenses with a desired operational profitability.

We believe that Geac has a narrow choice of complete vertical industry solutions compared to other large ERP vendors. It only recently introduced Web-based self-service applications, which is significantly later than some much smaller competitors (e.g. Great Plains and Lawson Software). Furthermore, the lack of Client Relationship Management (CRM) and Advanced Planning & Scheduling (APS) modules in its product suite will remain, even after the incorporation of JBA and Clarus. This adds additional future integration issues to a company that already faces massive integration of its disparate ERP systems.

Vendor Predictions

Despite a highly competitive environment, we predict that Geac has a potential of reaching US$2 billion in revenues within the next 4 years (60% probability), based on its expertise and stronghold in relatively untapped industries (See Vendor Strengths).

We believe that, within the next 18 months, the company will have to either acquire (55% probability) or partner with (45% probability) a vendor whose products would significantly enhance its customer relationship management (CRM) capabilities. The potential acquisition candidate is Onyx Software, while Clarify/Nortel or Pivotal are strong partnership candidates. Failing to do so will enable J.D. Edwards to regain and fortify its #4 ERP vendor position within the same time period (70% probability).

Within the next 3 years, more than 65% of Geac's license revenues will come from JBA System 21 and Geac SmartStream product lines (60% probability). During the same time, more than 75% of its total revenue will come from license revenue (60% probability) based on the company's need to integrate its products with other 3rd party products.

SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/geac-computer-corporation-mastering-growth-by-acquisitions-15193/

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