In the face of the mega-retail stores, like Wal-Mart and Target, some of America's oldest retailers have joined forces to remain competitive. Late 2004, Kmart Holding Corporation (NASDAQ:KMRT) and Sears, Roebuck and Co. (NASDAQ:S) signed a definitive agreement to merge. Following suit, Federated Department Stores, Inc. (NYSE:FD) and The May Department Stores Company (NYSE:MAY) announced February that they also entered into a merger agreement.
Part Two of the Retailers Join Forces for a "Make or Break" Attempt Their Competitive Landscape series.
On paper and in terms of numbers, these acquisitions look like idyllic marriages of convenience—they will, theoretically, create more powerful revenues players in the retail industry with their respective $55 and $30 billion (USD). Points of distribution and renowned proprietary home and apparel brands will be expanded and significant opportunities for improved scale and operating efficiencies will surely emerge. In the short term, by combining supply chains and aggregating their purchasing powers by, for example, consolidating shipments or leveraging volume deals with carriers, Sears and Kmart, estimates at least $300 million (USD) in savings. In theory, the merger could produce a new layer of competitive challenge to two undisputed mega-retailers, Wal-Mart and Target, by giving Sears Holdings a combined total of nearly 3,500 stores and by creating a service organization capable of a major expansion to serve the needs of existing Kmart and Sears customers.
The merger should generally enable the combined businesses of Sears and Kmart and of Federated and May, respectively, to produce higher profits or profit margins than any of these companies could achieve on their own. This may particularly be true for Kmart, for whom this merger is a virtue made out of necessity and likely the only way it could continue its long-term existence. While Kmart has improved its financial performance and operations since coming out of bankruptcy in 2003 to the point where it even become a buyer, it has not been able to distinguish itself from Wal-Mart and Target, not to mention an army of boutique specialty stores, catalog retailers, and Internet-based sellers. Without this merger, its stand-alone, long-term survival is difficult, at best.
The Kmart's conundrum has long been its inability to position itself clearly within the retail market. It was caught in a twilight zone between an extremely efficient low-cost retailer, Wal-Mart, and a fashion-oriented brand-name discounter, Target. At the same time, the company appeared to be oblivious to customers' voices of dissatisfaction as seen in its poor customer service, run-down stores, and indolent merchandising and outdated product lines.
Thus, Sears might provide a better corporate foundation, brand tradition, and more demand-driven growth strategy that can better leverage Kmart's extensive real estate assets more effectively in the highly competitive retail marketplace. Namely, the amalgamation might make the Sears and Kmart franchises stronger by accelerating Sears' much needed off-mall growth strategy by using existing, convenient Kmart locations.
As a proof of concept for the off-mall model, Sears is experiencing early positive results with three "grand" store formats. Instead of taking the time-consuming approach to assess a new site location and to build a store, Kmart's current store assets, distribution, and logistics infrastructure allows for a relatively immediate set of options that can be re-brand into Sears Grand and be broadened into new geographies. In fact, the idea for the merger was born during the recent sales transaction of several dozens stores between Sears and Kmart when they were independent.
Ultimately, the savings from the merger should certainly bolster Sears and Kmart's competitive strength, since their combined purchasing clout and streamlined supply chain capabilities is projected to result in $300 million (USD) of financial improvements. This may be cost equivalent to Target and somewhat improve costing against Wal-Mart. The volume of this combined portfolio can increased the opportunities for new private-label product development. According to some calculations, if improved process flows like stock availability, promotion planning, and price management are combined with (though not yet fully fleshed out) supply chain improvements, the combined entity could produce nearly $1 billion (USD) in cost and operational efficiencies. Still, these advantages, coupled with potential savings from workforce wages spiraling down across several industries, may reflect an emulation of Wal-Mart's practices rather than any sort of differentiation.
In the case of Federated and May, the cost efficiencies from their merger may not necessarily reverse the protracted decline in their department store sales, given its scale is much smaller than the behemoths like Wal-Mart and Home Depot. In fact, the merger might even increase the risk of brand equity erosion, given that in the future, their presence will no longer be as geographically dispersed, and that there will be a subsequent, reduced distinction between the stores' brand recognition.
This is Part Two of a three-part note.
Part One detailed the event summary.
Part Three will cover technology and make user recommendations.
Demographic Challenges
The Sears-Kmart merger should "beef up" their brand portfolios, since each will benefit from the other's distinctive merchandise assortment. On one hand, as Sears continues to fine-tune its merchandise strategy, successful product lines like the Kmart's Martha Stewart Everyday or Jaclyn Smith should become viable options to include in the Sears mix. Conversely, Kmart's remaining branded locations could see the introduction of longstanding Sears product lines, including Craftsman, Kenmore, or even the new Lands' End apparel products. Merchandising is to retailers what rosters of pitchers and hitters are to baseball sport clubs: the broader assortment of options should, in principle, allow each retailer to fine-tune products to the appropriate target customer demographics for each of the remaining product lines.
However, one should note that though Kmart and Sears are large retailers, they do sell to different groups of consumers— Sears sells mainly to married men in their late thirties and early forties who are looking for Craftsmen tools. Kmart targets largely senior citizens with lower incomes. This might impair future cross-selling. Moreover, Sears has not proven its proficiency with apparel. Its 2002 acquisition of Land's End, which pioneered the virtual fitting room back in 1999, has been poorly exploited.
The Land's End customer profile seemed to be a good fit with the demographics of buyers of Sears appliances and tools, and Sears attempted to use the preppy brand to lure well-off shoppers to its combined apparel and home appliances department stores. However, with apparel being a stocking nightmare with nearly a gazillion styles, sizes, and colors that completely change every three months or so (see Intentia: Stepping Out With Fashion and Style; Part One: Characteristics and Trends of the Fashion Industry), Sears often had meager selections at each locations, discouraging its middle-class clientele. Thus, the merger with Kmart provides both an opportunity and challenge of how Sears should handle the popular Land's End brand. However, one should note, that Sears may have already decided as there are early indications that it is seeking a buyer for the Land's End division .
In general, Sears Holding will have to force customers through a new learning curve with significant advertising campaigns to increase market share and customer loyalty to certain product brands. Customers will have to change their perception from discount mass merchandise stores to more upscale stores. However, Sears Holding will have to make sure that customers are not pressured by too aggressive sales associates trying to push the new retail image, because customers need to feel they are making informed decisions about their purchases. If not, customer loyalty may be compromised.
Developing a Competitive Strategy
Moreover, these potential benefits come with a number of significant "ifs and buts." The main question is whether Sears Holding can develop a successful, competitive strategy. At this stage, most consumers have different perceptions of merging parties. Kmart is still associated with low prices, boring store layouts, and mediocre services, while Sears, despite losing market share to equivalent general stores like Target, Lowe's or Kohl's, is synonymous with higher-quality merchandize and above-average customer service.
If Kmart is going to remain a mass discounter, how will it succeed in the long term if its prices remain even 15 percent higher than those of Wal-Mart? On the other hand, how will Sears, with its aura of a genuine North American retailer, differentiate from its competitors in terms of its product categories and the way its stores will be arranged, located, and stocked? In other words, the combined parties will have to figure out, first of all, what (or, if still diversified, in which ratio) they want to be. Do they want to be a mid-size retailer in the malls or a mega-store operator in the suburbs or rural areas? Once decided, they need to devise the merchandizing, pricing, payment, and other processes to back up their strategy.
The decisions the future Sears Holdings makes in the area of a coherent merchandizing strategy will not only have an impact on its future brand recognition, revenues, and margin, but also on the performance of its supply chain and downstream business processes. It must first figure out and then bring into line the capabilities and goals of merchandising, supply chain management (SCM), and its accompanying IT assets. It is expected that Sears Holdings will build its SCM capabilities around efficiency like Wal-Mart, but, for the sake of some differentiation, these competencies should also envelop speed and flexibility to compete with more versatile competitors.
Even if the two retailers merge their different corporate cultures, store formats, working procedures, and target demographics, perhaps the biggest challenge will be instilling a pervasive culture that embraces IT as an enabler.
SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/challenging-the-competition-mega-mergers-and-supply-chain-technology-17901/
Part Two of the Retailers Join Forces for a "Make or Break" Attempt Their Competitive Landscape series.
On paper and in terms of numbers, these acquisitions look like idyllic marriages of convenience—they will, theoretically, create more powerful revenues players in the retail industry with their respective $55 and $30 billion (USD). Points of distribution and renowned proprietary home and apparel brands will be expanded and significant opportunities for improved scale and operating efficiencies will surely emerge. In the short term, by combining supply chains and aggregating their purchasing powers by, for example, consolidating shipments or leveraging volume deals with carriers, Sears and Kmart, estimates at least $300 million (USD) in savings. In theory, the merger could produce a new layer of competitive challenge to two undisputed mega-retailers, Wal-Mart and Target, by giving Sears Holdings a combined total of nearly 3,500 stores and by creating a service organization capable of a major expansion to serve the needs of existing Kmart and Sears customers.
The merger should generally enable the combined businesses of Sears and Kmart and of Federated and May, respectively, to produce higher profits or profit margins than any of these companies could achieve on their own. This may particularly be true for Kmart, for whom this merger is a virtue made out of necessity and likely the only way it could continue its long-term existence. While Kmart has improved its financial performance and operations since coming out of bankruptcy in 2003 to the point where it even become a buyer, it has not been able to distinguish itself from Wal-Mart and Target, not to mention an army of boutique specialty stores, catalog retailers, and Internet-based sellers. Without this merger, its stand-alone, long-term survival is difficult, at best.
The Kmart's conundrum has long been its inability to position itself clearly within the retail market. It was caught in a twilight zone between an extremely efficient low-cost retailer, Wal-Mart, and a fashion-oriented brand-name discounter, Target. At the same time, the company appeared to be oblivious to customers' voices of dissatisfaction as seen in its poor customer service, run-down stores, and indolent merchandising and outdated product lines.
Thus, Sears might provide a better corporate foundation, brand tradition, and more demand-driven growth strategy that can better leverage Kmart's extensive real estate assets more effectively in the highly competitive retail marketplace. Namely, the amalgamation might make the Sears and Kmart franchises stronger by accelerating Sears' much needed off-mall growth strategy by using existing, convenient Kmart locations.
As a proof of concept for the off-mall model, Sears is experiencing early positive results with three "grand" store formats. Instead of taking the time-consuming approach to assess a new site location and to build a store, Kmart's current store assets, distribution, and logistics infrastructure allows for a relatively immediate set of options that can be re-brand into Sears Grand and be broadened into new geographies. In fact, the idea for the merger was born during the recent sales transaction of several dozens stores between Sears and Kmart when they were independent.
Ultimately, the savings from the merger should certainly bolster Sears and Kmart's competitive strength, since their combined purchasing clout and streamlined supply chain capabilities is projected to result in $300 million (USD) of financial improvements. This may be cost equivalent to Target and somewhat improve costing against Wal-Mart. The volume of this combined portfolio can increased the opportunities for new private-label product development. According to some calculations, if improved process flows like stock availability, promotion planning, and price management are combined with (though not yet fully fleshed out) supply chain improvements, the combined entity could produce nearly $1 billion (USD) in cost and operational efficiencies. Still, these advantages, coupled with potential savings from workforce wages spiraling down across several industries, may reflect an emulation of Wal-Mart's practices rather than any sort of differentiation.
In the case of Federated and May, the cost efficiencies from their merger may not necessarily reverse the protracted decline in their department store sales, given its scale is much smaller than the behemoths like Wal-Mart and Home Depot. In fact, the merger might even increase the risk of brand equity erosion, given that in the future, their presence will no longer be as geographically dispersed, and that there will be a subsequent, reduced distinction between the stores' brand recognition.
This is Part Two of a three-part note.
Part One detailed the event summary.
Part Three will cover technology and make user recommendations.
Demographic Challenges
The Sears-Kmart merger should "beef up" their brand portfolios, since each will benefit from the other's distinctive merchandise assortment. On one hand, as Sears continues to fine-tune its merchandise strategy, successful product lines like the Kmart's Martha Stewart Everyday or Jaclyn Smith should become viable options to include in the Sears mix. Conversely, Kmart's remaining branded locations could see the introduction of longstanding Sears product lines, including Craftsman, Kenmore, or even the new Lands' End apparel products. Merchandising is to retailers what rosters of pitchers and hitters are to baseball sport clubs: the broader assortment of options should, in principle, allow each retailer to fine-tune products to the appropriate target customer demographics for each of the remaining product lines.
However, one should note that though Kmart and Sears are large retailers, they do sell to different groups of consumers— Sears sells mainly to married men in their late thirties and early forties who are looking for Craftsmen tools. Kmart targets largely senior citizens with lower incomes. This might impair future cross-selling. Moreover, Sears has not proven its proficiency with apparel. Its 2002 acquisition of Land's End, which pioneered the virtual fitting room back in 1999, has been poorly exploited.
The Land's End customer profile seemed to be a good fit with the demographics of buyers of Sears appliances and tools, and Sears attempted to use the preppy brand to lure well-off shoppers to its combined apparel and home appliances department stores. However, with apparel being a stocking nightmare with nearly a gazillion styles, sizes, and colors that completely change every three months or so (see Intentia: Stepping Out With Fashion and Style; Part One: Characteristics and Trends of the Fashion Industry), Sears often had meager selections at each locations, discouraging its middle-class clientele. Thus, the merger with Kmart provides both an opportunity and challenge of how Sears should handle the popular Land's End brand. However, one should note, that Sears may have already decided as there are early indications that it is seeking a buyer for the Land's End division .
In general, Sears Holding will have to force customers through a new learning curve with significant advertising campaigns to increase market share and customer loyalty to certain product brands. Customers will have to change their perception from discount mass merchandise stores to more upscale stores. However, Sears Holding will have to make sure that customers are not pressured by too aggressive sales associates trying to push the new retail image, because customers need to feel they are making informed decisions about their purchases. If not, customer loyalty may be compromised.
Developing a Competitive Strategy
Moreover, these potential benefits come with a number of significant "ifs and buts." The main question is whether Sears Holding can develop a successful, competitive strategy. At this stage, most consumers have different perceptions of merging parties. Kmart is still associated with low prices, boring store layouts, and mediocre services, while Sears, despite losing market share to equivalent general stores like Target, Lowe's or Kohl's, is synonymous with higher-quality merchandize and above-average customer service.
If Kmart is going to remain a mass discounter, how will it succeed in the long term if its prices remain even 15 percent higher than those of Wal-Mart? On the other hand, how will Sears, with its aura of a genuine North American retailer, differentiate from its competitors in terms of its product categories and the way its stores will be arranged, located, and stocked? In other words, the combined parties will have to figure out, first of all, what (or, if still diversified, in which ratio) they want to be. Do they want to be a mid-size retailer in the malls or a mega-store operator in the suburbs or rural areas? Once decided, they need to devise the merchandizing, pricing, payment, and other processes to back up their strategy.
The decisions the future Sears Holdings makes in the area of a coherent merchandizing strategy will not only have an impact on its future brand recognition, revenues, and margin, but also on the performance of its supply chain and downstream business processes. It must first figure out and then bring into line the capabilities and goals of merchandising, supply chain management (SCM), and its accompanying IT assets. It is expected that Sears Holdings will build its SCM capabilities around efficiency like Wal-Mart, but, for the sake of some differentiation, these competencies should also envelop speed and flexibility to compete with more versatile competitors.
Even if the two retailers merge their different corporate cultures, store formats, working procedures, and target demographics, perhaps the biggest challenge will be instilling a pervasive culture that embraces IT as an enabler.
SOURCE:
http://www.technologyevaluation.com/research/articles/challenging-the-competition-mega-mergers-and-supply-chain-technology-17901/
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